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Abstract
We study sponsor-based business model innovations where a rm monetizes its product
through sponsors rather than setting prices to its customer base. We analyze strategic
interactions between an innovative entrant and an incumbent where the incumbent
may imitate the entrant's business model innovation once it is revealed. The results
suggest that an entrant needs to strategically choose whether to reveal its innovation
by competing through the new business model, or conceal it by adopting a traditional
business model. We also show that the value of business model innovation may be
so substantial that an incumbent may prefer to compete in a duopoly rather than to
remain a monopolist.
Key words: business model innovation; imitation; sponsor-based business model; strate-
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INTRODUCTION
Schumpeter (1934) distinguishes between ve types of innovations: new products, new meth-
ods of production, new sources of supply, exploitation of new markets, and new ways to or-
ganize business. Much of the literature so far has focused on the rst two types of innovation
(e.g., Shan, Walker, and Kogut 1994; Banbury and Mitchell 1995; Eisenhardt and Tabrizi
1995; Schroeder 2006; Katila and Chen 2008; Leiblein and Madsen 2009; Roberts 1999; Adner
and Kapoor 2010; Leiponen and Helfat 2010; Zhou and Wu 2010). Our study focuses on the
last type of innovation, often referred to as business model innovation today. Business model
innovation has become increasingly important both in academic literature and in practice
given the increasing number of opportunities for business model congurations enabled by
technological progress, new customer preferences, and deregulation.
At root, business model innovation refers to the search for new logics of the rm, new ways
to create and capture value for its stakeholders, and focuses primarily on nding new ways to
generate revenues and dene value propositions for customers, suppliers, and partners (e.g.,
Amit and Zott 2001; Magretta 2002; Zott and Amit 2007, 2008; Baden-Fuller et al. 2008;
Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart 2010; Gambardella and McGahan 2010; Teece 2010). As a
result, business model innovation often aects the whole enterprise (Amit and Zott 2001).
New entrants in a wide array of industries have demonstrated time and again that in-
novative business models can provide the basis for sustainable business success, even in
competitive settings with well-established incumbents. But just as product and process in-
novations are hard to protect, business model innovations can be imitated: British Airways
(BA) launched Go, a copycat of Ryanair's no-frills model, to compete against European
low-cost airlines; Recoletos, one of the largest Spanish media groups, launched Qu e!|an ad-
sponsored free newspaper|in 2005 to ght the entry of similar titles such as Metro Spain;
and in 2007, CBS Interactive copied Hulu's media streaming business model.
These empirical observations suggest that incumbents often learn about new business
models from entrants and respond by incorporating these innovations (in full or in part)2 Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
into their own businesses. The possibility of competitive imitation, in turn, suggests that
entrants need to strategically choose whether to reveal their ideas by competing through the
new business model or, instead, to conceal them by adopting a traditional, established logic
of value creation and value capture.
While a few theoretical studies have created frameworks to examine competitive dynam-
ics among rms employing dierent business models (e.g., Lin, Ke, and Whinston 2008;
Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu 2010), these frameworks do not capture the role of innovation
and competitive imitation in rms' choices of business models. In this paper, we examine the
desirability or lack thereof of business model innovations when such innovations cannot be
protected and, thus, competitive imitation is possible. Specically, we ask: under what cir-
cumstances will an entrant benet from adopting a new business model when the innovation
may be imitated by an incumbent?
Given the diversity of business models currently employed by companies in all sorts
of industries, we must constrain the scope of our undertaking by studying|from among
the many that exist, could exist|an important class of business model innovations. We
focus here on business model innovations that allow a rm to monetize its product through
sponsors rather than by setting prices directly to its customer base. We refer to this class of
innovations as sponsor-based business model innovations. To illustrate, consider the following
examples:
 Publishing houses traditionally earn their revenues by selling books to readers at pos-
itive prices. Alternatively, the publisher could include ads intertwined with the book's
text and monetize this content by charging advertisers. In the extreme, the publishing
house could give the books away for free and make money through ads only. Imple-
menting such a scheme would be relatively easy for ebooks, as the ads could change
over time, just as they do in news websites.
 The traditional way for porn websites to monetize their content is by charging prices to
surfers. However, some sites are currently competing with a business model whereby3 Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
surfers can obtain free porn if they help solve a few \captchas" to create new, legitimate
email accounts.1 The free email accounts are often worth more to spammers than the
bandwidth porn surfers consume downloading videos and images, and the porn site
can monetize them by selling these email accounts to spammers.
 The traditional way ski resorts monetize their oering is by charging skiers positive
prices for access to the slopes. With the growth of timeshare apartments close to the
slopes,2 ski resorts are increasingly partnering with real estate rms in a business model
where skiers are oered free access to the slopes in exchange for enduring several hours
condominium timeshare sales-pitches. In this new scheme, the ski resort monetizes
access to the slopes through revenues obtained from the real estate company instead
of prices paid by the skiers.
 When commercial email service appeared in the early 1990s, ISPs such as CompuServe,
Prodigy, and America Online supplied email to paying subscribers through a usage-
based billing system and, later, through monthly subscriptions. Launched on July 4,
1996, Hotmail (originally \HoTMaiL") was the rst free email service. A few months
after launch, Hotmail began displaying advertisements, thus becoming the rst ad-
sponsored email service. Implementing such business model required Hotmail to pro-
vide access to email through an interface where ads could be easily updated. Hotmail
stored emails on \the cloud" rather than on users' own desktops and most users ac-
cessed their accounts through a browser where ads could be updated quickly.
These four examples are instances of the general class of situations that we study. Specif-
ically, there is a traditional business model that involves monetizing the product through
prices charged to consumers (for books; for porn; for access to the slopes; for email ser-
1Captchas are scrambled text boxes that many websites use to block bots. For example, Gmail uses
captchas on its account creation page to prevent automatized creation of Gmail accounts which would later
be used to send spam.
2Timeshare is a form of ownership of real estate (condominiums generally) whereby multiple parties hold
rights to use the property, and each sharer is allotted a period of time (typically one week, and almost always
the same time every year) in which they may use the property.4 Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
vice), but an innovator has found a new way to monetize the oering by giving it away to
customers and obtaining revenue from some sponsors. To persuade sponsors to pay, a rm
needs its consumers to provide something to the sponsors in return. Consumers often derive
less utility from the rm's product or service as a result: indeed, in the above examples the
customer suers a reduction in the quality of the good or service, and thus an impoverished
consumption experience (book readers and email users must be exposed to advertisements;
porn surfers must solve some captchas; skiers must sit and listen about timeshare for a
number of hours).
We choose to focus our study on sponsor-based business model innovations for three rea-
sons. First, such innovations appear to be increasingly prevalent in today's economy. For
example, many companies choose to nance themselves using ad revenues and oer their
products or services free to consumers. Such products and services today range from news-
papers to software applications, from television programs to online search engines. The
increasing popularity of sponsor-based business models has been partly fueled by opportuni-
ties granted by Internet technologies which allow much improved targeting of advertisements
and promotions as well as improved opportunities for direct interaction between rms and
consumers.
Second, while many business model innovations that are to be adopted require full re-
congurations to a rm's activity system, sponsor-based business model innovations are
generally not overly burdensome. For example, it is easier for the New York Times to oer
a free, ad-sponsored newspaper than for Ethan Allen to operate like IKEA or for Avis to
reinvent itself into a Zipcar. The implication is that sponsor-based business model innova-
tions seem particularly easy to imitate. Since the purpose of our study is to analyze the
eects of potential imitation on a rm's incentives for business model innovation, the case
of sponsor-based business models is most relevant.
Third, although the notion of sponsor-based business model is well-known in sectors of
the media industry, its penetration into other arenas has been a gradual process, as success-5 Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
ful implementation of this business model type is not always obvious. For example, while
the modern magazine industry originated in the mid-17th century, magazines began using
advertisements as a means of nancial support only late the 19th century.3 Similarly, Eu-
ropean no-frills air service providers (such as Ryanair) earn a large share of their revenues
not from ticket prices but from such ancillary sources as subsidies from secondary airports
or payments from bus companies taking passengers from those airports to city centers. Ob-
viously, such revenue sources had been available to traditional ag carriers before the entry
of low-cost airlines. Without a doubt, sponsor-based business models will become feasible in
an ever-increasing number of industries.
Setup and main results
Our study oers the rst formal model of business model innovation in a game-theoretic
framework. We focus on sponsor-based business model innovation and provide a compre-
hensive analysis of strategic interactions between an innovative entrant and an incumbent
where their choices of business models are endogenously determined, and where the incum-
bent may imitate an entrant's innovation once it is revealed.
We analyze a three-stage game with two rms, an entrant and an incumbent, oering
vertically dierentiated products. In the rst stage, the entrant chooses the business model
through which it intends to compete: it can either compete through the traditional business
model (charging a price to customers for the product) or innovate by adopting a sponsor-
based business model (charging zero price and monetizing the customer base in ways that
aect product quality negatively|as noted above). Prior to entry, the incumbent operates
the traditional model and is unaware of the innovation. For simplicity, we assume that rms
face no capacity constraints.
In the second stage, the incumbent observes the entrant's business model and chooses its
own in response. If the entrant chooses the traditional business model, then the incumbent
3Source: http://www.answers.com/topic/magazine, accessed May 2010.6 Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
does not learn that there is an alternative way to compete and it may only respond with a
version of the traditional business model (for example, it may introduce several products all
based on the traditional model). However, if the entrant chooses the new business model,
the incumbent can learn the innovation and may choose to imitate it, in full or in part.
In the third stage, rms make their tactical choices about how they will compete within
their choices of business model. We use the expression monetization intensity to refer to
the size of the cost imposed to customers in exchange for the free product. In the examples
above, monetization intensity corresponds to the number of ads in the book or on the website,
to the number of captchas to be solved for access to free porn, and to the number of hours
that skiers must listen to promoters of timeshare condominiums. Obviously, the stronger is
the monetization intensity, the larger is the revenue per customer that the rm derives from
the sponsors. However, as monetization intensity grows, product quality (and consumers'
willingness to adopt) deteriorates. In this stage, the entrant chooses price if it entered
with the traditional business model, or monetization intensity if it entered with the new
business model. The incumbent chooses price and/or monetization intensity, depending on
its business model and the entrant's choice.
Our analysis provides several new results. First, we nd that the entrant will some-
times choose to strategically reveal or conceal its innovation. Strategic revelation refers to
a situation where the entrant prefers to compete through the new business model when it
would choose not to do so if the incumbent was expected to continue competing through
the traditional model. Such revelation induces the incumbent to change its business model
in a way that is benecial to the entrant. Strategic concealment refers to a situation where
the entrant prefers not to compete through the new business model when it would choose to
do so if the incumbent was expected to continue competing through the traditional model.
Such concealment prevents the incumbent from changing its business model in a way that is
detrimental to the entrant.
We nd that strategic revelation (concealment) may occur only when the entrant's prod-7 Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
uct is of higher (lower) quality than the incumbent's product. This result suggests that
revealing or concealing business model innovations is an important strategic decision for
innovators. Moreover, the result implies that there may be a range of business model inno-
vations that end up not being implemented because of the expected competitive imitation
by incumbents.
We also nd that not all business model combinations emerge in equilibrium. In partic-
ular, we nd that the equilibrium industry conguration often entails both rms competing
through dierent business models (and our model, therefore, provides a rationale for rm
heterogeneity). Understanding why rms operate under dierent business models in the
same industry is a long-standing question in strategy. Our study shows that explicitly en-
dogenizing rms' choices of business models in a game-theoretical framework is a promising
approach to tackle this question.
While much of the prior literature on positioning focuses on dierentiation through prod-
uct design, our work nds that the benets from business model dierentiation (i.e., the value
of innovation) can be substantial for both rms: indeed, we nd that both the incumbent
and the entrant could make more prots with the innovation, even if the incumbent does
not directly benet from it.
Finally, we nd that the value of business model innovation may be so substantial that
the incumbent may prefer a duopoly than remaining a monopolist. This happens when the
entrant's choice of business model reveals the innovation, and the benet to the incumbent
from learning about it more than compensates for the loss of prot incurred in competing
with the entrant. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the rst to show formally that,
when competitors complement each other through business model innovation, competition
for the same customers with vertically dierentiated products can lead to more prots for
the incumbent than a monopoly.8 Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
Related literature
Our study contributes to several strands of literature. First, our paper contributes to the lit-
erature on innovation and imitation. Scholars have looked at how new products or processes
can be imitated by their competitors (e.g., Benoit 1985; Gallini 1992; Pepall and Richards
1994; Ethiraj, Levinthal, and Roy 2008) and whether rms should disclose or license their
innovations (e.g., Hill 1992; Gans, Murray, and Stern 2008; Mukherjee and Stern 2009). Fol-
lowing these studies, we assume rms can imitate each other's business model innovations
once they are revealed.
The literature on imitation is closely related to the broader literature on the transfer
of best practices among rms (e.g., Csaszar and Siggelkow 2010). Studies have identied a
variety of factors such as the absorptive capacity of the imitator, and the complexity of the
strategy to be imitated that facilitate or inhibit successful transfer of practices across rms
or across dierent units within a rm (e.g., Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Kogut and Zander
1992; Zander and Kogut 1995; Rivkin 2000; Knott 2003; Szulanski, Cappetta, and Jensen
2004). Unlike these studies that typically look from the perspective of an imitating rm and
examine practices within it, we study an innovator's decision on whether to reveal its new
way of creating and capturing value, and explicitly model the competitive dynamics between
the innovator and its imitator in a game-theoretic framework. In addition, we also allow the
imitator to creatively combine the innovator's new business model with its current model to
create new ones.
Our work also contributes to the growing literature examining competitive dynamics
between rms with dierent business models. Studies have examined such dynamics in a
number of industries, including the software industry (e.g., Casadesus-Masanell and Ghe-
mawat 2006; Economides and Katsamakas 2006; Casadesus-Masanell and Yoe 2007; Lee
and Mendelson 2008), the cable industry (Seamans forthcoming), and the music industry
(Casadesus-Masanell and Hervas-Drane 2010). Much of this literature has focused on inter-
actions between rms with exogenously given business models. A few recent studies (e.g.,9 Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu 2010; Casadesus-Masanell and Llanes 2011; Lin et al. 2008)
have endogenized rms' choices of business models by allowing rms to select their business
models before deciding their optimal tactics to compete (as they would do in the real world).
In these studies, however, the available business models are assumed to be common knowl-
edge among all rms. As a result, these models are not suitable for evaluating the value of
business model innovation. Our paper extends this line of work by explicitly modeling the
role of innovation. We assume that, initially, an entrant is the only rm aware of a new
business model and it chooses its business model before the incumbent reacts. The set of
business models available to the incumbent may expand or remain unchanged, depending on
whether the entrant chooses to reveal the innovation.
Our approach to modeling innovation follows the literature on unawareness (see Dekel,
Lipman, and Rustichini 1998, and references therein). Bages-Amat (2008) suggests that
incorporating unawareness is a useful approach to studying innovation and creativity, and
(according to this literature, e.g., Li 2008; Bages-Amat 2008), an agent is unaware of some-
thing if he does not know it, and he does not know that he does not know it (and so on ad
innitum). Therefore, \being unaware of" a business model is dierent from simply \not
knowing" about it: a rm that does not know the new business model, but is aware of it (i.e.,
knows that it does not know about it) can still take it into account. We apply the concept
of unawareness to study business model innovation. In our game, the incumbent is bounded
rational: if the entrant does not reveal the business model innovation, the incumbent remains
\unaware" of the innovation|and continues to compete as if the new business model did not
exist; once the entrant reveals the innovation, however, the incumbent becomes aware of it,
and can then take it into account when formulating its strategy. As Gavetti and Levinthal
(2004) point out, bounded rationality in theoretical models \has typically taken the form of
myopic hill-climbing, or quasi-Skinnerian bases of action. Strategic action clearly involves
greater degrees of intentionality, so fuller representations of cognition would need to be in-
corporated into such theoretical eorts." Our approach to incorporating unawareness allows10 Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
the players to have great degrees of intentionality|the incumbent always makes an optimal
decision given the information it has and becomes fully rational once the entrant reveals the
innovation.
Our approach to modeling competitive dynamics between the entrant and the incumbent
is similar to Shaked and Sutton (1982) in that rms' products are vertically dierentiated and
the extent of dierentiation aects the intensity of competitive rivalry. Dierent from Shaked
and Sutton (1982), our setting also allows rms to dierentiate themselves by adopting
dierent business models. The dierence between our setup and that of the Shaked and
Sutton (1982) is most pronounced when we consider two rms oering products of similar
quality. In their setup, the low product dierentiation leads to intense price competition
and nullify both rms' prots. Hence, rms nd it hard to co-exist. In our model, the two
rms can easily co-exist and be protable by choosing dierent business models, which create
dierentiation in the realized product quality.
Finally, the paper is related to the literature on platforms and multi-sided markets (e.g.,
Rochet and Tirole 2003; Caillaud and Jullien 2003; Armstrong 2006; Hagiu 2009; Casadesus-
Masanell and Ruiz-Aliseda 2009; Zhu and Iansiti forthcoming). Platforms are institutions
that act as intermediaries to enable transactions between multiple sides of a market|such
as sponsors and consumers. Most of the literature on multi-sided markets and platforms
considers situations where the sides attract one another. For example, operating system
platforms connect two sides: independent software vendors and users. Clearly, the more
applications are available for a particular operating system, the more attractive that system
is to users. Likewise, the larger the number of users of a particular operating system, the
more attractive it is for developers to produce applications for that system. When a platform
is sponsor-based, however, consumers prefer to access the product without interference by
the sponsors (i.e., consumers prefer books or email without ads, porn without captchas, or
access to slopes without sales pitches). Our paper contributes to this literature by exploring
the desirability (or lack thereof) of entering a market with a two-sided business model when11 Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
one side imposes a negative externality on the other.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We rst present our model setup and
provide the theoretical results. We then discuss the implications of the results and conclude
after suggesting some extensions to the analysis.
MODEL
Setup
Our model involves two prot-maximizing rms, an incumbent and an entrant, indexed by
k 2 fi;eg. Firms may obtain revenues from two dierent sources: they may charge a price for
their product pk, and they may nd a business model innovation that allows them to monetize
their oering while giving the product away to customers. To model the second source of
revenue, let mk be the intensity of this alternative monetization eort (a variable that can be
decided by rms within the game, since such choices are endogenous within its framework).
In the examples above, mk is the number of ads in the book or on the website, the number
of captchas to be solved to access free porn, and the number of hours that skiers must listen
to promoters of timeshare condominiums. If sk(mk) individuals adopt the product, then
the total revenue derived from this monetization eort mk is: Mk =   sk(mk)  mk, where
 > 0 is an exogenous parameter that represents the (per consumer) monetization rate.4;5
For simplicity, we assume that rms face no capacity constraints.
On the demand side, there is one unit mass of consumers. Consumers are dierentiated
by their type , which represents their marginal willingness to pay for product quality and is
uniformly distributed on [0;1]. The utility that a consumer of type  receives from product
k 2 fi;eg is U() = (qk m2
k) pk, where qk > 0 denotes the (exogenous) quality of product
4In advertising models,  > 0 corresponds to the (per consumer) advertising rate charged to each
advertiser. See, for example, Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (2004).
5We note that it would be natural to allow the composition of the rm's customer base to aect sponsors'
willingness to pay for access to the rm's customers. The simplest way to incorporate this dependence
would be by allowing  to vary across consumer type. Unfortunately, such an extension renders the model
intractable. Thus, we follow earlier theoretical work (e.g., Armstrong 2006; Gabszewicz et al. 2004; Jiang
2010; Lin et al. 2008) and assume that  is constant.12 Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
k. Note that the monetization intensity mk is felt as a nuisance by consumers|the greater
it is, the lower they perceive the quality of the rm's product to be. The convex functional
form implies that mild monetization eorts (such as forcing consumers to listen for a few
minutes the selling of a timeshare apartment opportunity) are tolerated well but more intense
monetization eorts are irritating. Note that the use of a sponsor-based business model has
implications not only concerning value capture (sponsors, rather than consumers, are the
sole source of revenue), but also relating to value creation (the rm's monetization eorts
lead to lower willingness to pay for the product).
Prior to entry, the incumbent employs the traditional business model: it sells its product
at positive prices but is unaware of other opportunities to further monetize its oering.
Thus, the traditional business model has: mk = ? and pk > 0.6 The entrant may adopt
the traditional business model or it may innovate as already described. If it innovates, its
business model has: mk > 0 and pk = ?. Thus, the business model innovation is 180 away
from the traditional business model. We denote the traditional business model by T and the
new business model (the innovation) by I.
If entry occurs and the entrant innovates, the incumbent becomes aware of the entrant's
monetization idea and may then choose to recongure its business model to respond. For
example, the incumbent may choose to compete with I, which entails moving from (mk =
?; pk > 0) to (mk > 0; pk = ?). Alternatively, it may decide to stay put with the original
model T, or to adopt elements of the new business model by setting (mk > 0; pk > 0) so that
its product is sold at positive prices and, at the same time, it is further monetized through
mk. We denote this combined business model by M, because it is a mixture of T and I.
We impose a non-negativity constraint on price pk and monetization intensity mk, and
normalize consumers' utility from outside options to zero. Each consumer only adopts one
product. In addition (and without loss of generality), we adopt two tie-breaking rules: 1)
if a consumer receives zero utility from adopting a product, they will choose to adopt the
6We use the empty set symbol ? to denote that that element is not in the business model.13 Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
product, and 2) if a consumer is indierent between two products, they will choose to adopt
the product with a higher quality.
Timing
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the entrant decides its business model (the
incumbent's model is preset at T). Second, the incumbent learns about the entrant's choice
of business model and chooses a business model to respond. Third, tactical choices (prices
and/or the monetization intensities) are made by both rms, and demand and prots are
realized.
As mentioned, the set of business models available to the incumbent in the second stage
is contingent on the entrant's business model choice. If the entrant chooses T, then the
incumbent remains unaware of how to further monetize the product|their choice is limited
to T. However, if the entrant chooses I, then the set of business models available to the
incumbent expands.
We allow the incumbent to respond to entry in one of two ways|by staying with one
product and competing through business models T, I, or M, (I and M are available only
if the entrant has chosen I), or by introducing a ghting brand.7 We use a 2-tuple, (x;y),
to denote the business model choices of the two rms: x denotes the entrant's and y the
incumbent's. Dierent business model choices give rise to dierent tactical interactions
between rms, which we study in the next section.
Figure 1 shows the game where each combination of business models corresponds to a
dierent subgame. The possible business model combinations we consider are:
(T;T): The entrant chooses the traditional business model and the incumbent responds with
the same business model;
(T;TT): The entrant chooses the traditional business model and the incumbent responds
7The term \ghting brand" has been frequently used by scholars and practitioners (e.g., Mintzberg
1987; Rao, Bergen, and Davis 2000) to refer to situations where an incumbent responds to competition by
expanding its product line with a lower-quality product.14 Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
by introducing a ghting brand with quality qi0 < qi. Therefore, the incumbent oers two
products in this case, the original product of quality qi and the ghting brand of quality qi0;8
(I;T): The entrant chooses to innovate and the incumbent responds by staying put with the
traditional business model;
(I;M): The entrant chooses to innovate and the incumbent responds with the mixed business
model (combining price and monetization eorts);
(I;I): The entrant chooses to innovate and the incumbent imitates and responds by imitating
this new business model;
(I;TT): The entrant chooses to innovate and the incumbent responds by introducing a
ghting brand with quality qi0 < qi based on the traditional business model. The incumbent
winds up with two products;
(I;TI): The entrant chooses to innovate and the incumbent responds with a ghting brand
with quality qi0 < qi based on the new business model. The incumbent winds up with two
products.
[Figure 1 about here.]
It is easy to see that business model II (where the incumbent oers two products, both
based on the innovation) is dominated by I when the entrant chooses I. Moreover, business
models IT and TI (where the incumbent oers two products, one based on the traditional
business model and the other on the innovation) are equivalent. Therefore, it is unnecessary
to consider subgames (I;II) and (I;IT) explicitly in our setup and this is why they do not
appear in Figure 1.
Business models as prot functions
As noted above, by business model we mean \the logic of the rm, the way it operates and
how it creates and captures value for its stakeholders" (Baden-Fuller et al. 2008; Casadesus-
8We model the choice of qi0 as preceding the pricing choices of the two rms, since quality decisions are
often longer-term decisions than price decisions.15 Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
Masanell and Ricart 2010). To be able to work formally with business models, we represent
them in the form of simple prot functions. Thus, the choice of a particular business model
corresponds, in our development, to the choice of a particular prot function. Prot func-
tions are highly simplied, reduced form representations of business models. These stylized
representations allow tight mathematical analyses. Zott and Amit (2010) propose the use
of Porter's (1996) activity systems to represent business models. Porter's activity systems
embody richer representations of business models and provide a textured picture of how the
rm creates and captures value. Activity systems emphasize that a rm is more than the
mere addition of activities as complementarities may result in important competitive advan-
tages. On the negative side, activity systems are not amenable to game-theoretical analysis
because they often contain many elements and are too complex.9
To illustrate our approach, consider the subgame (I;T) where the entrant has chosen
to innovate and the incumbent stays put with the traditional business model. The prot
functions are obtained as follows. We rst examine the case where qi > qe. Here, the
incumbent maximizes prots by setting pi and the entrant maximizes prots by setting me
subject to the constraint that qe  m2
e  0 (so that its product has nonnegative net quality).
As the entrant's product is given away for free, consumers who do not buy product i will
adopt product e. The type of the consumer who is indierent between the two products, ,
is dened by qi   pi = (qe   m2
e) and the prots are:

(I;T)
i = (1   
)pi and 
(I;T)
e = 
 me; (1)
9We think of prot functions as representations of business models as if looked at from a distance. We
could \zoom down" closer to the actual details of the business model used by the rm and come up with
more complex prot functions that explicitly accounted for additional elements in the business models that
we have not considered. For example, the particular human resource management policies in place, the
production technologies used, or the marketing policies (just to name a few) are all part of \the logic of the
rm, the way it operates and how it creates value for its stakeholders" and, thus, are all part of a rm's
business model, and could be included in the prot function to have a more detailed representation of the
rm's business model. However, in most cases, these \closer," more complete representations of business
models are too complex to be amenable to mathematical analyses.16 Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
subject to 0    1, and qe   m2
e  0.
Consider now the case where qe > qi. There are two cases:
Case 1: qe   m2
e  qi. Here, as the entrant product is free and is of higher quality, the
incumbent is pushed out of the market, and all consumers adopt product e. The prots of
the two rms are: 
(I;T)
i = 0 and 
(I;T)
e =   1  me = me.
Case 2: qe   m2
e < qi. Now, as the entrant's product is free, all consumers will adopt either
the incumbent's product or the entrant's product as long as qe   m2
e  0. Prot functions
in this case coincide with equation (1).
The entrant will compare the prots from these two cases and decide the optimal level of
me. This concludes our derivation of the prot functions for subgame (I;T). The derivations
of prot functions for the six remaining subgames are presented in Appendix A of the working
paper version of this paper (Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu 2011).
RESULTS
We look for the subgame perfect equilibria of the game. Therefore, we proceed by backward
induction by rst nding the equilibrium tactical choices in each subgame (pk and/or mk,
depending on the business model combination) and then considering the equilibrium business
model choices.
Optimal tactics for each business model combination
The equilibrium analysis of the optimal tactical choices for each subgame is straightforward.10
We allow the entrant's product quality, qe, to be higher or lower than the incumbent's,
qi. In both cases, we nd that if the entrant chooses the traditional business model, both
rms will coexist in equilibrium. As the incumbent does not learn about the innovation, it
will continue to adopt the traditional business model.
If the entrant chooses to innovate in its business model, it is possible that the entrant or
10See Appendix B of the working paper version of this paper for the equilibrium analysis (Casadesus-
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the incumbent will be pushed out of the market. In particular, when the entrant's product
is of higher quality than the incumbent's, the incumbent can co-exist with the entrant only
when its product is of relatively high quality (qi > 3
4 qe). In this case, the entrant chooses
to maximize monetization intensity such that its net quality, qe   m2
e, is 0, as pushing the
incumbent out of the market requires setting a low monetization intensity which brings lower
prots. When the entrant's product is of lower quality than the incumbent's, the entrant
risks being pushed out of the market by the incumbent when  is large.
These results suggest that an entrant that does not innovate cannot be killed|one that
does, however, can be forced out if it introduces the innovation in the wrong situation.
Therefore, if the entrant is unsure about how its product's quality compares to that of the
incumbent, it is \safer" to choose not to innovate but, instead, to compete through the
traditional business model.
Business model choice
Having derived the equilibrium tactics and payos under each possible combination of busi-
ness models, we now analyze the rst and second stages of the overall game|when rms
choose their business models.
The following diagram shows the equilibrium business model combinations for dierent
parameter values. The horizontal axis is the monetization rate  and the vertical axis is the
quality ratio qe=qi.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Proposition 1 summarizes the features of Figure 2a and Proposition 2 those of Figure 2b.
Proposition 1. When qi < qe:
a. The only business model combinations that may arise in equilibrium are (T;T), (I;T),
and (I;TT).
b. The entrant always survives and the incumbent is pushed out in the (I;T) region only.18 Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
c. (T;T) is the equilibrium business model conguration when  is small and qe=qi is
large. (I;TT) is the equilibrium business model conguration when  is large and qe=qi
is small. (I;T) is the equilibrium business model conguration when both  and qe=qi
are large.
To understand why (I;I), (I;TI), (I;M), and (T;TT) cannot be equilibrium business
model congurations, note that when the entrant chooses to innovate and qe > qi, the
incumbent will never respond with a business model that involves mi > 0 because the
Bertrand-style competition results in qe m2
e = qi, pushing the incumbent out of the market:
hence (I;I) and (I;TI) will never be the equilibrium business model choices. Choosing a
mixed model can also never be an incumbent's best response to ght an entrant adopting
the new business model, since the entrant will always prefer to push the incumbent out of
the market in this case. Finally, when the entrant chooses the traditional business model,
the only possible choices for the incumbent are T and TT, and as argued above, TT will be
dominated by T.
Part (b) states that the incumbent is pushed out of the market only when the equilibrium
business model conguration is (I;T). Obviously, when the equilibrium business models are
(T;T) both rms co-exist. In the (I;TT) case, the incumbent best-responds to the entrant's
adoption of the innovation by introducing a ghting brand that induces the entrant to
respond with a large monetization intensity. As vertical dierentiation between the entrant
product and the incumbent's high-quality product increases, the incumbent can earn greater
prots: however, the introduction of a ghting brand in response to an entrant adopting
innovation results in positive incumbent prots only when the quality ratio qe=qi is less than
4=3.
To understand part (c), note that when  is large, the entrant has a strong incentive
to innovate. In this case, if the quality ratio qe=qi is larger than 4=3 the entrant pushes
the incumbent out of the market no matter which business model the incumbent adopts.
However, when the quality ratio is lower than 4=3, the incumbent can avoid being killed by19 Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
choosing TT, which forces the entrant to set the maximum possible monetization intensity.
Vertical dierentiation increases and the incumbent earns positive prots. When  is low and
the quality ratio qe=qi suciently large, the entrant prefers to choose the traditional model
as the monetization revenue is low otherwise. In this case, the incumbent (still unaware of
the innovation) can only respond by choice of T or TT (as it continues to be unaware of the
innovation) and, as we have argued, the former dominates the latter.
We now turn to studying the situation where qe < qi, as illustrated in Figure 2b.
Proposition 2. When qi > qe:
a. The only business model combinations that may arise in equilibrium are (T;T), (I;T),
and (I;M).
b. Both rms co-exist in equilibrium.
c. (I;M) is the equilibrium business model conguration when  is intermediate and qe=qi
is small, and (I;T) is the equilibrium business model conguration when both  and
qe=qi are intermediate. For all other values of  and qe=qi, (T;T) is the equilibrium
business model conguration.
The intuition for why (I;I) and (I;TI) are never equilibrium outcomes is the same as
in Proposition 1, except that here it is the entrant rather than the incumbent that tries to
avoid being killed. (I;TT) and (T;TT) do not occur in equilibrium because having a second,
low-quality product makes no dierence to the incumbent's prots.11
To understand part (b), note that the incumbent cannot be pushed out because it has a
higher-quality product and can always price its product close to zero to obtain positive de-
mand. Moreover, the entrant can always choose to compete through the traditional business
model to obtain positive prots.
11It is important to realize that the incumbent is not concerned about being pushed out of the market
when qe < qi. Therefore, releasing the second product does not serve the same purpose as when qe > qi (see
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Turning to (c), note that (I;M) is the equilibrium business model conguration that has
a quality ratio below 1=2, in which case, the entrant is pushed to the corner where its net
quality is zero (i.e., me =
p
qe). When the entrant adopting the innovation is expected to
be at the corner, the incumbent's optimal choice is the mixed business model.
In the (I;T) region, the monetization rate  is suciently high for the entrant to prefer
to innovate but not suciently high for the incumbent to best-respond by imitating. Nor
will the incumbent choose the mixed model as its response because when qe=qi > 1=2,
monetization intensities are strategic substitutes. This means that if the incumbent chooses
the mixed business model M (thus setting mi), product dierentiation will be smaller than
if it competes with the traditional model (because the entrant will respond to M by setting a
lower me). The reduced product dierentiation is more detrimental to the incumbent's prots
than the additional monetization of the customer base (given the relatively low monetization
rate).
To understand the (T;T) region, note rst that when  is large, the entrant does not want
to reveal the innovation because the incumbent will respond by imitating the new business
model and will end up pushing the entrant out of the market. If, however, the monetization
rate  is low, the business model innovation is unattractive because the impact of additional
mk on market share is substantial but the additional monetization would be very small. In
this case, the entrant chooses the traditional business model and the incumbent responds
with the same business model.
DISCUSSION
This section discusses several implications of our formal business model innovation frame-
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Strategic revelation and strategic concealment
We begin by examining the conditions under which the entrant prefers to strategically reveal
or conceal its innovation. We rst formally dene strategic revelation and concealment in
our context.
 Strategic revelation refers to a situation where the entrant prefers to compete through
the new business model when it would choose not to do so if the incumbent was
expected to continue competing through the traditional model.
 Strategic concealment refers to a situation where the entrant prefers to not compete
through the new business model when it would choose to do so if the incumbent was
expected to continue competing through the traditional model.
In other words, strategic revelation means choosing the new business model (revealing the
innovation) to induce the incumbent to change its business model in a way that is benecial
to the entrant; and strategic concealment means choosing the traditional business model
(concealing the innovation) to prevent the incumbent from changing its business model in a
way that is detrimental to the entrant.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the regions where the entrant strategically reveals or conceals
its business model innovation, respectively. In both gures, panel (a) shows the entrant's
optimal choice of its business model under the assumption that the incumbent will not
change its business model.12 Panel (b) superimposes panel (a) and the equilibrium business
model congurations derived in Figure 2 to show the regions with strategic revelation and
concealment.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Region 1 in Figure 3b exhibits strategic revelation: here the entrant reveals the innovation
by choosing to compete through the new business model to induce the incumbent to change
12Of course, we are allowing the incumbent to adjust price in response to the entry.22 Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
its business model. Specically, because region 1 is contained in region (I;TT), the entrant
knows that the incumbent will respond by introducing a ghting brand, which in turn will
induce the entrant to increase its monetization intensity that help increase entrant's prots.
Interestingly, if the incumbent continued to compete through the traditional model without
a ghting brand, in equilibrium, the entrant would lower monetization intensity and thus
its prots. The reason is that the trade-o between market share and monetization revenue
per user is resolved dierently when the ghting brand is available|since the ghting brand
makes the entrant less worried about market share and induces it to choose more aggressive
monetization me.
Turning to the case where qe < qi, regions 1 and 2 in Figure 4b exhibit strategic conceal-
ment: the entrant chooses the traditional business model, thus concealing the innovation,
even though it would choose to reveal it if the incumbent were constrained to stay with the
traditional model.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Strategic concealment takes place through dierent mechanisms in these two regions.
In region 1, if the entrant chose to innovate in its business model, the incumbent would
respond by introducing a ghting brand based on the new model. Because the entrant has
a product of lower quality, it would be pushed out of the market, so it chooses to conceal
the innovation. In region 2, if the entrant chose to innovate, the incumbent would respond
by adopting the mixed business model. The resultant lower vertical dierentiation would
end up hurting (though not killing) the entrant, so here, again, the entrant is better o by
concealing the innovation.
Figures 3 and 4 indicate that strategic revelation (concealment) may occur only when the
entrant's product is of higher (lower) quality than the incumbent's product. This suggests
that business model innovations are more likely to be revealed when the quality of the
innovators' product is high and that revealing or concealing business model innovations is23 Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
an important strategic decision for innovators. Moreover, the result implies there may be
a range of business model innovations that end up not being implemented because of the
expected competitive responses by incumbents.
Who benets from business model innovation?
To tackle this question, we consider as a benchmark a situation where the entrant has not
come up with the business model innovation. This means that the entrant must compete with
the traditional business model and we compute the prots that the incumbent and the entrant
obtain if the entrant adopts the traditional business model. We compare this benchmark
to the prots that both rms obtain under the equilibrium business model congurations
that we have derived in the section titled \Results" (which are summarized in Figure 2).
This comparison allows us to determine the value of the business model innovation to the
incumbent and to the entrant.
Proposition 3. The entrant strictly benets from the innovation in all regions where it
adopts the innovation (i.e., (I;M), (I;T), and (I;TT) in Figure 2). The incumbent strictly
benets from the innovation in the (I;TT) region of Figure 2a, and (I;T) and (I;M) region
of Figure 2b, and becomes strictly worse o in the region (I;T) of Figure 2a. The innovation
has no eect on either the incumbent's or entrant's protability in regions where the entrant
does not adopt the innovation (i.e., the (T;T) regions of Figure 2).
Obviously, if the entrant does not adopt the innovation, both the entrant and incumbent
will compete with the traditional business model and, as a result, their protability will
remain unchanged. Because the entrant is the rst mover and has superior knowledge from
the innovation, it will benet from choosing the new business model (i.e., regions (I;M),
(I;T), and (I;TT) in Figure 2)|otherwise it would choose to compete with the traditional
business model.
In regions (I;TT) of Figure 2a and (I;M) of Figure 2b, the entrant will be at the corner,
so the incumbent makes more pro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the traditional business model (as in this case the entrant would not be at the corner). In
region (I;T) of Figure 2b, with innovation, the entrant's net quality becomes lower and the
two products are more dierentiated. With the low intensity of competition, the incumbent
prots increase with the innovation. The incumbent's protability decreases, however, in
region (I;T) of Figure 2a: without innovation, the two would co-exist with both earning
positive prots|but with innovation, the entrant will push the incumbent out.
Might the incumbent ever prefer to be a duopolist rather than a monopolist?
We now investigate whether the benets from innovation could ever be so substantial that the
incumbent preferred facing competition from an innovative entrant to remaining a monopo-
list. In this case, the benchmark is a situation where the incumbent faces no competition.
We show that while the transition from monopoly to duopoly generally implies lower prof-
itability, in certain circumstances, an incumbent may strictly prefer a duopolistic industry
structure!
Proposition 4. The incumbent is strictly better o as a duopolist than as a monopolist in
region (I;M) of Figure 2b, and is indierent between being a duopolist and being a monopolist
in region (I;TT) of Figure 2a. In all other regions in Figure 2, the incumbent is strictly
better o as a monopolist.
In all regions where the entrant chooses the traditional business model, the incumbent is
strictly worse o in a duopoly, as it does not learn the innovation and has to compete with a
product with positive net quality. Hence, we only need to consider the regions (I;M), (I;T)
and (I;TT) in Figure 2. In the (I;T) region of Figure 2a, the incumbent is pushed out of the
market; in the (I;T) region of Figure 2b, the incumbent is competing with an entrant whose
product has a positive net quality. Hence, the incumbent becomes worse o with the entrant
in these two regions. The incumbent makes the same prots with or without the entrant
in the region (I;TT) of Figure 2a because in equilibrium, the net quality of the entrant's
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Interestingly, the incumbent gains strictly greater protability in the (I;M) region of
Figure 2b. In this case, because the quality ratio qe=qi is low, the net quality of the entrant's
product is zero. In addition, the incumbent now learns how to combine the innovation with
the traditional model and can derive some additional revenue (through the monetization of
its customer base). Therefore, in the (I;M) region both rms benet (strictly) from the
business model innovation!
We conclude that when rms compete with dierent business models, competition may
be benecial to both rms, as well as to their consumers. This result contrasts with the
common scenario where rms compete with the same business model, when their protability
is always adversely aected by competition. While this phenomenon has been documented
elsewhere through case study research (Casadesus-Masanell, Fernandez, and Jobke 2007;
Casadesus-Masanell and Campbell 2008), to the best of our knowledge, our paper oers the
rst formal model where this sort of business model complementarity between competitors
arises endogenously.
LIMITATIONS, EXTENSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
We conclude this paper by discussing several limitations and extensions to our model.
Endogenous quality
Our analysis has deemed the entrant's quality qe exogenous.13 We now consider the en-
dogenous choice of qe at a stage prior to the entrant's choice of business model. Given that
the game is already intricate when quality is exogenous, we resort to numerical analysis to
analyze the entrant's optimal quality level.
The game is as before except that there is a stage zero where the entrant chooses qe at
cost c(qe) = cq2
e, where c > 0 is a constant cost parameter. To identify the entrant's optimal
quality level, we plot the entrant's maximum prots as a function of quality qe for dierent
13We note, however, that the realized quality when the entrant chooses to innovate qe m2
e is endogenous
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combinations of monetization rate  and cost parameter c in Figure 5.14 The gure also
indicates the equilibrium business model choice by the entrant for each qe by making use of
the results summarized in Figure 2.15
[Figure 5 about here.]
The curve can be discontinuous as the incumbent may respond by changing its business
model. Comparing Figure 5a to Figure 5b, we nd that when  is low|so that there are
equilibria where the entrant chooses the innovative business model when qe < qi (see Figure
2b)|the optimal quality is qe < qi and the business model chosen is the innovative one; when
 is so high that the only equilibrium when qe < qi is (T;T) (see Figure 2b), the entrant
prefers qe = qi and the innovative business model. Thus, while entrants with sponsor-based
business models will often choose to have lower-quality products than incumbents, they will
choose to increase their product quality when  is high.
We also nd that when c is low, as in Figure 5c, the entrant's prots are maximal by
choosing quality qe > qi and competing with the traditional business model. When c is high
and  low, however, the entrant will choose quality qe < qi and the traditional business
model (see Figure 5d).
These results show that there is no necessary correlation between equilibrium business
models and endogenous quality levels. The quality levels and business models observed
in equilibrium are the outcome of complex tradeos between the cost of quality cq2
e, the
monetization rate , and the expected competitive response by the incumbent as summarized
by Propositions 1 and 2.
Adoption cost of dierent business models
For simplicity, our model assumes the adoption cost of any business model to be zero, but
in reality, of course, there will always be cost involved in reconguring one's business model,
14The gure has qi = 1.
15The colorings of Figures 2 and 5 are mutually consistent.27 Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
which may vary for dierent business models. For example, ad-sponsored business models
could be less costly to adopt than fee-based models, since a rm such as Metro often does
not have to manage such complicated distribution channels, or maintain billing systems for
collecting subscription fees. Hence, our analysis may underestimate the benets an entrant
might gain from the lower costs of its business model innovation. We also assume the costs
to the incumbent involved in learning about the business model innovation as zero, although
(as Rivkin 2000 shows) rms may suer large penalties from small errors when learning and
imitating others' business models. If the cost of imitation seems likely to be high and the
entrant product is of lower quality, the incumbent may choose not to learn and copy, and
the entrant will be more likely to reveal than to conceal its innovation.
Partial unawareness
In our analysis, we have assumed that the incumbent remains unaware of the business model
innovation if the entrant chooses not to adopt it. The assumption is consistent with prior
studies suggesting that business model imitation often requires changes to the entire activity
system and partial imitation may lead to large penalties (e.g., Zott and Amit 2010; Rivkin
2000). In this regard, our model and results are applicable to situations where an incumbent
knows about the new business model conceptually but is unable to adopt it without observing
the actual implementation by another rm.
When a business model innovation requires simple changes to an activity system, it is
possible that an incumbent can implement it by simply learning about the idea (through
employee mobility, for example) after an entrant has gured out the innovation (e.g., Agar-
wal, Ganco, and Ziedonis 2009). While the full analysis of the entrant's strategic decisions
incorporating the possibility that an incumbent can implement a business model innovation
without observing its implementation is beyond the scope of the current paper, the spirit of
the paper carries over to this new setting: an entrant will face a similar strategic dilemma
over whether to engage in research on a new business model anticipating that an incumbent
may learn about it and implement it.28 Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
The possibility that an incumbent may adopt a business model innovation even if an
entrant does not adopt it does not necessarily lead to worse outcomes for the entrant. For
example, consider the situation where an entrant's product quality is right below that of an
incumbent. In this case, our current analysis shows that fT;Tg is the equilibrium business
model combination when  is suciently large (see Figure 2b). In this case, the entrant
prefers to conceal the innovation as otherwise the incumbent would imitate and push the
entrant out of the market. The equilibrium prots for both rms under fT;Tg are low due to
the low vertical product dierentiation. In this case, both rms can earn higher prots if the
incumbent is able to learn about the innovation and implement it. In the new equilibrium,
the entrant adopts the traditional business model, the incumbent adopts the innovation, and
the two rms end up with products that are substantially vertically dierentiated.
Empirical implications
While a few studies have examined the linkage between business model choices and rm
performance (e.g., Pauwels and Weiss 2008; Zott and Amit 2007, 2008), no empirical studies
have looked at how rms strategically conceal or reveal new business models. The lack
of empirical studies on this question is most likely due to the diculty in collecting data
on possible business model implementations that did not happen. Our paper provides a
conceptual framework to think about this issue. While empirically testing our propositions
using a large sample dataset seems a daunting, if not impossible, task given the diculty
involved in data collection, these theoretical results can be helpful to ethnographic researchers
as they conduct detailed case studies of business model innovations.
Our work also points to the possibility of a potential selection bias and an endogeneity
concern in empirical studies of business models. As rms may conceal new business models
because of competitive imitation, researchers will only be able to observe business models
adopted. In addition, the adoption decisions of business model innovations can be endoge-
nously determined by rm-level characteristics and market factors (e.g., product quality and
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be correlated with rm performance at the same time. Hence, empirical studies examining
business model choices and rm performance need to explicitly account for this endogeniety
to avoid spurious correlations.
Conclusion
Our paper shows that, as well as dierentiating themselves in product quality terms, rms
can adopt dierent business models. We nd some win-win scenarios, where entrants' new
business models can benet both them and their incumbent competitors, and is of greatest
value when both oer products of similar quality. Indeed, new entrants (such as Hotmail
and Pandora) oering similar products or services to the incumbents' have became very
successful by adopting dierent business models.
Perhaps the most important implication of our study is that rms should take into account
the likely competitive eects before revealing a business model innovation. Entrants should
realize that incumbents will react to innovations in two main ways: they can keep their
business model intact and adjust its tactical variables (such as price); or they can adopt a
new business model so as to change their value creation and capture logic. The new business
model may be a replica of the innovator's, or alternatively a new hybrid that combines some
of its elements with others from the incumbent's original model in a mixed business model.
When an innovative entrant decides whether to adopt a new business model, it must
consider the possible responses of its rival. Such rival actions may nullify gains that might
otherwise accrue to the entrant's innovation. The range and power of incumbents' potential
strategic responses mean that there might be many business model innovations out there
that never see the light of day. Finding examples of strategic concealment is dicult because
we are looking for cases of business model innovations that have not been implemented by an
innovative entrant for fear of imitation. These are particularly dicult to nd in the setting of
sponsor-based business models, which are a relatively new phenomenon. It is easy, however,
to observe situations where an entrepreneur mistakenly chooses to adopt a new business
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the innovation. In such cases, the entrant would be better o concealing its business model
innovation. An example in the context of sponsor-based business models would be Metro
Spain, the rst ad-sponsored free newspaper launched in Spain in 2001. After observing the
implementation of Metro Spain, several incumbents copied its business model. For example,
Recoletos launched Qu e! in 2005 and Editorial P agina Cero launched ADN in 2006, both
of which are ad-sponsored free newspapers. In 2009, Metro Spain ceased its operation as a
result of sti competition. The business model of Metro, the parent company of Metro Spain,
is also being imitated in many other countries (e.g., Switzerland) by incumbent newspapers.
As a result of this competitive imitation, Metro's nancial situation has been deteriorating
in recent years: its stock price dropped from more than 80 kr in 2000 to less than 0.8 kr in
2011.16;17
From the society's perspective, strategic concealment could generally be seen as not good
for welfare: some might argue that some form of intellectual property protection regulation
might encourage the emergence of more new business models. However, the practical dif-
culties of enshrining and policing such an extension to intellectual property rights would
probably be insurmountable.
Business model innovation is a slippery construct to study. The rst implementation of a
new business model idea in an industry makes all rms in the sector (and beyond) aware of
the new way of conducting business, thus (there being no intellectual property protection)
limiting the innovator's ability to take advantage of its idea. Hence, any studies of a business
model innovation that has already been implemented may oer little lessons for entrants.
While for readers of this paper the idea of sponsor-based business model innovation should
16Source: http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/chart?symbol=MTROsdbb.ST, access August
2011.
17While our study focuses on sponsor-based business models, entrepreneurs may nd the concept of
strategic concealment useful when they consider adopting other business model innovations. For example,
PPG entered China's clothing retail industry in 2005 using a new business model that relies exclusively on
call centers and the Internet to sell traditional clothing. Traditional clothing retailers such as Younger and
Good News Bird in China responded by imitating the business model and integrating it with their existing
store-based business model, and pushed PPG out of the market in 2009.31 Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
be clear by now, the dierent ways in which such a general notion can come to life are
theoretically innite, and even in practical terms myriad: every particular implementation
constitutes a business model innovation in its own right, to which our analysis can apply.
We can expect rms in all breeds of industries to continue to amaze us with unprecedented
new ways to capture value through sponsor-based business model innovation for many years
to come.
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Figure 1: The strategic innovation game.
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Figure 3: Optimal business models when qe > qi.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
!"#$%&$
!"
#$$'$#%"
($
($
)'*$
)'*$
)$
!%#$%&$
(a) Optimal BM without imitation.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
!"
#$!"!#%"
#!
#!
$"%!
$"%!
$!
&"
'"
(b) Strategic revelation and concealment.
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Figure 5: Entrant's prots as a function of qe.
ONLINE APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: PROFIT FUNCTIONS FOR THE SEVEN SUBGAMES
Subgame 1: (T;T)
In this case, the entrant chooses the traditional business model and the incumbent chooses
to compete with the same model.
We rst consider the case when the incumbent has a better quality, i.e., qi > qe. The con-
sumer 1 indierent between purchasing from the incumbent and the entrant is determined
by 1qi   pi = 1qe   pe. Hence, 1 =
pi pe
qi qe: The consumer 2 indierent between purchasing
from the entrant product and not purchasing at all is determined by: 2qe   pe = 0. Hence,ii Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
2 =
pe
qe. Therefore, the prots for the incumbent and the entrant are:

(T;T)
i = (1  
pi   pe
qi   qe
)pi:

(T;T)
e = (
pi   pe
qi   qe
 
pe
qe
)pe:
We can similarly derive the prot expressions when qe > qi:

(T;T)
i = (
pe   pi
qe   qi
 
pe
qe
)pi:

(T;T)
e = (1  
pe   pi
qe   qi
)pe:
Subgame 2: (T;TT)
In this case, the entrant chooses the traditional business model and the incumbent oers two
products, i and i0, with qi > qi0. While the quality of qi is exogenously given, the incumbent
may create a ghting brand by strategically downgrading the quality of its original product,
choosing qi0 before engaging in the pricing subgame with the entrant.
When qi > qe, there are two cases to consider:
Case 1: qi > qi0 > qe. We rst derive the types of indierent consumers, 1, 2, and 3,
between adopting qi and qi0, between adopting qi0 and qe, and between adopting qe and not
adopting. We have 1 =
pi pi0
qi qi0 , 2 =
pi0 pe
qi0 qe, and 3 =
pe
qe. Prots of the incumbent and the
entrant are:

(T;TT)
i = (1  
pi   pi0
qi   qi0
)pi + (
pi   pi0
qi   qi0
 
pi0   pe
qi0   qe
)pi0:

(T;TT)
e = (
pi0   pe
qi0   qe
 
pe
qe
)pe:
Case 2: qi > qe > qi0. We again derive the types of indierent consumers, 1, 2, and 3,
between adopting qi and qe, between adopting qe and qi0, and between adopting qi0 and not
adopting. We have 1 =
pi pe
qi qe, 2 =
pe pi0
qe qi0 , and 3 =
pi0
qi0 . Prots of the incumbent and the
entrant are:

(T;TT)
i = (1  
pi   pe
qi   qe
)pi + (
pe   pi0
qe   qi0
 
pi0
qi0
)pi0:

(T;TT)
e = (
pi   pe
qi   qe
 
pe   pi0
qe   qi0
)pe:iii Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
When qe > qi, we must have qe > qi > qi0. We could similarly derive the following prot
functions:

(T;TT)
i = (
pe   pi
qe   qi
 
pi   pi0
qi   qi0
)pi + (
pi   pi0
qi   qi0
 
pi0
qi0
)pi0:

(T;TT)
e = (1  
pe   pi
qe   qi
)pe:
Subgame 3: (I;T)
Please see the main text as this case has been presented when we introduce the model in
detail.
Subgame 4: (I;M)
We rst consider the case where qi > qe. The incumbent product now comes with mon-
etization intensity, mi, and is priced at pi > 0. The indierent consumer is dened by
(qi   m2
i)   pi = (qe   m2
e). Hence,  =
pi
qi m2
i qe+m2
e, and the prots are:

(I;M)
i = (1  
pi
qi   m2
i   qe + m2
e
)(pi + mi):

(I;M)
e =
pi
qi   m2
i   qe + m2
e
me:
s:t: qi   m
2
i  0; qe   m
2
e  0:
For this business model to be meaningful, we need that pi > 0 and mi > 0. Otherwise, one
of the pure business models is the eective one.
We now consider the case where qe > qi. There are two cases.
Case 1: qe   m2
e  qi. In this case, the incumbent is pushed out. The prots are thus:

(I;M)
i = 0:

(I;M)
e = me:
s:t: qe   m
2
e  qi:
Case 2: qe   m2
e < qi. In this case, the incumbent product will always be active as it can
come with lower monetization intensity and low price. The indierent consumer's type, ,
is determined by (qi   m2
i)   pi = (qe   m2
e). Hence,  =
pi
qi m2
i qe+m2
e. The prots areiv Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
thus:

(I;M)
i = (1  
pi
qi   m2
i   qe + m2
e
)(pi + mi):

(I;M)
e =
pi
qi   m2
i   qe + m2
e
me:
s:t: qi   m
2
i  0; qe   m
2
e  0:
The entrant will compare the prots from both cases and decide the level of me.
Subgame 5: (I;I)
When both the incumbent and the entrant provide free products, all consumers will adopt
the product with the highest net quality. This competitive situation is similar to Bertrand
competition, except that now the two rms are setting the monetization intensities, not
prices.
When qi > qe, the prots are:

(I;I)
i =
8
<
:
mi if qi   m2
i  qe   m2
e
0 otherwise.

(I;I)
e =
8
<
:
0 if qi   m2
i  qe   m2
e
me otherwise.
s:t: qi   m
2
i  0 and qe   m
2
e  0:
When qe > qi, the prots are:

(I;I)
i =
8
<
:
0 if qe   m2
e  qi   m2
i
mi otherwise.

(I;I)
e =
8
<
:
me if qe   m2
e  qi   m2
i
0 otherwise.
s:t: qi   m
2
i  0 and qe   m
2
e  0:
Note that we are assuming that when both products, i and e, are of the same net quality,
consumers prefer the oering of the higher quality rm. This is without loss of generality.18
18For example, when qi > qe, the incumbent could always set its net quality, qi   m2
i, at qe   m2
e +  to
attract all consumers.v Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
Subgame 6: (I;TT)
First, we consider the case where qi > qe. There are two cases.
Case 1: qi > qi0 > qe   m2
e. As the entrant product is free, as long as qe   m2
e  0,
all consumers will make adoptions. We rst derive the types of the indierent consumers
between the incumbent's two products, and between the incumbent low-quality product and
the entrant product: 1 =
pi pi0
qi qi0 and 2 =
pi0
qi0 qe+m2
e, respectively. The prots are thus:

(I;TT)
i = (1  
pi   pi0
qi   qi0
)pi + (
pi   pi0
qi   qi0
 
pi0
qi0   qe + m2
e
)pi0:

(I;TT)
e = 
pi0
qi0   qe + m2
e
me:
s:t: qi > qi0 > qe   m
2
e  0:
Case 2: qi > qe   m2
e  qi0. In this case, product i0 obtains no demand in equilibrium. The
type of the indierent consumer between product i and qe is  =
pi
qi qe+m2
e. The prots are:

(I;TT)
i = (1  
pi
qi   qe + m2
e
)pi:

(I;TT)
e = 
pi
qi   qe + m2
e
me:
s:t: qi > qe   m
2
e  qi0  0:
We now consider the case where qe > qi. There are three cases.
Case 1: qe  m2
e  qi > qi0. In this case, the incumbent is pushed out of the market and the
entrant has a demand of 1. The prots are thus:

(I;TT)
i = 0:

(I;TT)
e = me:
s:t: qe   m
2
e  qi:
Case 2: qi > qe  m2
e  qi0. In this case, the low quality product of the incumbent is pushed
out of the market. Hence, this is equivalent to the case where the incumbent uses only onevi Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
product to respond to the entrant. From our discussion of the (I;T) case, we have:

(I;TT)
i = (1  
pi
qi   qe + m2
e
)pi:

(I;TT)
e = 
pi
qi   qe + m2
e
me:
s:t: qi > qe   m
2
e  qi0:
Case 3: qi > qi0 > qe   m2
e. In this case, all three products may be active. We rst derive
the types of indierent consumers between the two products oered by the incumbent, and
between the low-quality product of the incumbent and the entrant product as 1 =
pi pi0
qi qi0
and 2 =
pi0
qi0 qe+m2
e. The prots are thus:

(I;TT)
i = (1  
pi   pi0
qi   qi0
)pi + (
pi   pi0
qi   qi0
 
pi0
qi0   qe + m2
e
)pi0:

(I;TT)
e = 
pi0
qi0   qe + m2
e
me:
s:t: qi > qi0 > qe   m
2
e  0:
In equilibrium, both the incumbent and the entrant will compare their prots from these
three cases and decide their optimal levels of qi0, pi, pi0, and me.
Subgame 7: (I;TI)
In this case, the incumbent introduces two products: product i that is traditional and product
i0 that is based on the new business model. When qi > qe, suppose that the monetization
intensities mi0 and me are such that the entrant is pushed out of the market. Then, consumers
either buy the high-quality product of the incumbent or consume the free product of the
incumbent. In this case, the indierent consumer  is determined by qi pi = (qi m2
i0).
That is,  =
pi
m2
i0. Suppose instead that the monetization intensities, mi0 and me, are such
that the entrant is not pushed out of the market. Then, consumers either buy the high-
quality product of the incumbent or consume the product of the entrant. In this case, the
indierent consumer  is determined by qi  pi = (qe  m2
e). That is,  =
pi
qi qe+m2
e.vii Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
The prots are:

(I;TI)
i =
8
<
:
(1  
pi
m2
i0)pi +
pi
m2
i0 mi0 if qi   m2
i0  qe   m2
e
(1   )pi otherwise.

(I;TI)
e =
8
<
:
0 if qi   m2
i0  qe   m2
e

pi
qi qe+m2
e me otherwise.
s:t: qi   m
2
i0  0; qe   m
2
e  0:
This business model is meaningful only when pi > 0, mi0 > 0, and me > 0.
Now consider the case where qe > qi. In this case, the entrant again engages in Bertrand
type competition with the free product of the incumbent. The entrant will push out both
products of the incumbent when qe   m2
e  qi. The entrant will push out the free product
of the incumbent if qi > qe  m2
e > qi  m2
i0. The case is equivalent to the (I;T) case. When
qi   m2
i0 > qe   m2
e, the entrant product will be pushed out. In this case, the indierent
consumer between the incumbent's two products  is determined by qi pi = (qi m2
i0).
That is,  =
pi
m2
i0. The prots are:

(I;TI)
i =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 if qe   m2
e  qi
(1  
pi
qi qe+m2
e)pi else if qi > qe   m2
e > qi   m2
i0
(1  
pi
m2
i0)pi +
pi
m2
i0 mi0 otherwise.

(I;TI)
e =
8
> > > <
> > > :
me if qe   m2
e  qi

pi
qi qe+m2
e me else if qi > qe   m2
e > qi   m2
i0
0 otherwise.
s:t: qi   m
2
i  0 and qe   m
2
e  0:
APPENDIX B: OPTIMAL TACTICS FOR EACH BUSINESS MODEL COMBINATION
Propositions A-1 and A-2 describe the equilibrium tactics for each subgame.19 Without loss
of generality, we adopt the following tie-breaking rule: when two dierent business model
combinations yield the same payos, we select the combination with fewer products. This
rule captures the fact that introducing new products will generally involve some cost. For
example, Propositions A-1 and A-2 show that the payos are the same in subgames (T;T)
19We provide all proofs in Appendix C.viii Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
and (T;TT). The tie-breaking rule suggests that (T;T) is preferred to (T;TT).
We consider rst the interactions when the entrant's quality is above that of the incum-
bent.
Proposition A-1. When qi < qe, the optimal prices and monetization intensities under
each business model combination are:
 (T;T): pi =
(qe qi)qi
4qe qi and pe =
2qe(qe qi)
4qe qi .
 (T;TT): The optimal pi and pe are the same as in the (T;T) case: pi =
(qe qi)qi
4qe qi and
pe =
2qe(qe qi)
4qe qi . The incumbent sets pi0 =
(qe qi)qi0
4qe qi in equilibrium such that there is zero
demand for product i0.
 (I;T): pi = 0 and me =
p
qe   qi. The incumbent is pushed out of the market.
 (I;M): pi = 0, mi = 0, and me =
p
qe   qi. The incumbent is pushed out of the
market.
 (I;I): mi = 0 and me =
p
qe   qi. The incumbent is pushed out of the market.
 (I;TT): When qi < 3
4qe, the entrant sets me =
p
qe   qi and the incumbent is pushed
out of the market. Otherwise, me =
p
qe and the incumbent receives positive demand.
The equilibrium choices are qi0 = 0, pi = qi=2, and pi0 = 0. The incumbent's lower-
quality product i0 receives no demand but aects the equilibrium outcome.
 (I;TI): pi = 0, mi0 = 0 and me =
p
qe   qi. The incumbent is pushed out of the
market.
The intuitions for these results are as follows.
Subgame (T;T). In this case, we obtain the standard result of two vertically dierentiated
competitors ghting for the same customers.20 The high-quality rm sells twice the demand
(at a higher price) than the low-quality rm. In equilibrium, the entrant sells to more than
half of the market.
Subgame (T;TT). Just as in the standard model of a muti-product monopolist with
vertically dierentiated products, the incumbent prefers oering only one product: its low-
quality product i0 is priced such that it obtains no demand, so payos in this case coincide
with those of (T;T). Of course, if oering two products was costlier than oering only one,
(T;TT) would be strictly dominated by (T;T).
20See, for example, Shaked and Sutton (1982) or Tirole (1994).ix Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
Subgame (I;T). In this case, the incumbent is pushed out of the market. The entrant's
two choices are either to set the monetization intensity so that its product's net quality is
greater than the incumbent's quality, qe  m2
e  qi, or it can choose a monetization intensity
so that its net quality is lower, qe   m2
e < qi. In the rst case, the entrant's product is both
free and of higher quality, so the incumbent is pushed out of the market. In the second
case, the entrant trades o market share and revenue per unit of share. The entrant's prots
are: market share (
pi
qi qe+m2
e) times revenue per consumer (me), i.e., 
(I;T)
e =
pi
qi qe+m2
e me.
As me increases, market share decreases faster than revenue per consumer grows. As a
consequence, the entrant will prefer to reduce me when qe   m2
e < qi. The entrant ends up
choosing me such that qe   m2
e = qi, and the incumbent ends up with no demand.
Subgame (I;M). In equilibrium the incumbent is pushed out of the market for the same
reasons as in subgame (I;T). Even though it has the option of using its monetization eorts
to dierentiate itself from the entrant, the entrant's trade-o between market share and
revenue per consumer still results in the incumbent being pushed out.
Subgame (I;I). In this case, there is Bertrand-type competition between the incumbent
and the entrant.21 Therefore, the entrant cannot choose a high me as it has to oer a product
of net quality at least as large as that of the incumbent without ads. Hence, the optimal
me is constrained by qe   m2
e  qi. When this constraint is satised, all consumers adopt
product e. Therefore, it is in the entrant's interest to maximize its monetization intensity
by setting me so that qe   m2
e = qi.
Subgame (I;TT). In this case, there are three possible scenarios. First, the entrant's net
quality may be larger than the incumbent's high-quality product (i.e., qe   m2
e > qi), and
the incumbent is pushed out because the entrant's product is of higher quality and is free.
Second, the entrant's net quality may be between the quality levels of the incumbent's two
products (i.e., qi > qe m2
e > qi0), making product i0 irrelevant. Just as in the (I;T) subgame,
the entrant's net quality ends up being equal to qi so the incumbent is again pushed out.
Finally, the entrant's net quality may be lower than the incumbent's low-quality product,
qe   m2
e < qi0. Now, the same argument as in the (I;T) subgame applies to the interaction
between the entrant's product e and the incumbent's low-quality product i0. As in that case,
the entrant ends up setting its net quality to match qi0, although, in this case, the incumbent's
high-quality product obtains positive demand. It is optimal for the incumbent to set qi0 = 0
so that there is no interaction between its high-quality product and the entrant's product,
leaving the incumbent with monopoly power for its high-quality product.
21While in Bertrand's model rms choose prices, here rms choose the monetization intensity.x Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
The entrant thus has the power to decide whether the incumbent is pushed out or not (by
choosing me so that qe   m2
e > qi > qi0, qi > qe   m2
e > qi0, or qi > qi0 > qe   m2
e).
The entrant can compare its prots in these scenarios: when the quality dierence between
e and i is low (qi > 3
4 qe), coexistence brings more prots to the entrant because (given
the incumbent's relatively high quality) pushing the incumbent out requires setting a low
monetization intensity.
Subgame (I;TI). As in the (I;I) case, a Bertrand competition argument implies that
only the higher-quality product oered through I survives. Therefore, in equilibrium, the
incumbent will reduce the monetization intensity for its I product to zero. In the end
qe   m2
e  qi = qi0 and hence, the incumbent obtains no demand.
We now present the results when the entrant's product is of lower quality.
Proposition A-2. When qi > qe, the optimal prices and monetization intensities under
each business model combination are:
 (T;T): pi =
2(qi qe)qi
4qi qe and pe =
qe(qi qe)
4qi qe .
 (T;TT): The optimal pi and pe are the same as in the (T;T) case: pi =
2(qi qe)qi
4qi qe and
pe =
qe(qi qe)
4qi qe . The incumbent sets qi0 = qi so that product i0 obtains zero demand.
 (I;T): When qi  2qe, pi = qi=2 and me =
p
qe; when qi < 2qe, pi = qi   qe and
me =
p
qi   qe.
 (I;M): We may have a corner solution in which qe   m2
e = 0 or an interior solution
in which qe   m2
e > 0.
At the interior solution, mi and me solve the following system:
8
<
:
qi   qe + m2
e =
m3
i
mi 
me =
p
qi   qe   m2
i
;
and pi = 1
2 ((qi   m2
i)   (qe   m2
e)   mi)):
At the corner solution, mi solves: m3
i + qi(   mi) = 0; me =
p
qe, and pi = (qi  
mi( + mi))=2.
 (I;I): mi =
p
qi   qe and me = 0. The entrant is pushed out of the market.
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 (I;TI): pi = 1
2(qi   qe + 
p
qi   qe), mi0 =
p
qi   qe, and me = 0. The entrant is
pushed out.
The intuitions for these results are as follows.
Subgames (T;T), (T;TT), (I;I), and (I;TI). The intuitions for these are analogous
to those in Proposition A-1, except that now the high-quality product is oered by the
incumbent.
Subgame (I;T). The optimal tactics of the incumbent in this case depend on whether
the entrant sets its monetization intensity at the corner or not (i.e., me =
p
qe or me >
p
qe),
which in turn depends on the exogenous vertical dierentiation between the incumbent's
and the entrant's products. The entrant's prots increase with its market share and with
me, but there is a tradeo between the two. When the entrant's product is of very low
quality (qi  2qe), it is best for it to maximize monetization intensity because its market
share,  =
pi
qi qe+me2, is insensitive to me (the derivative of  with respect to me approaches
zero as the dierence between qi and qe grows). On the other hand, if its quality is close to
the high-quality incumbent (qi < 2qe),  is sensitive to the monetization intensity and it is
optimal for the entrant to reduce me to gain market share.
When qi  2qe, there is no cannibalization between the two products: qe   m2
e = 0. The
indierent consumer obtains zero utility. When qi < 2qe, the net quality of the entrant in
equilibrium is positive: qe m2
e = qe qi=2 > 0. The indierent consumer has positive utility
from both products.22
Subgame (I;M). As the incumbent product is not free, consumers with low  will not
buy it: they will adopt the entrant's product as long as it oers positive utility. As a result,
both the incumbent and the entrant co-exist in equilibrium.
The solution may be at a corner, where the entrant chooses the maximum possible moneti-
zation intensity (me =
p
qe) such that the utility for its product is zero. The corner solution
happens when the quality dierence is large (i.e., qi > 2qe). In this case, the unconstrained
prot-maximizing me (i.e.,
p
qi   qe   m2
i) would exceed the maximum monetization inten-
sity that the entrant can possible have (i.e.,
p
qe). The entrant chooses to set me at
p
qe, and
the indierent consumer receives zero utility. Or the solution may be interior (me <
p
qe).
22It is interesting to note that  = 1=2 in both cases. That is, the incumbent and the entrant always split
the market equally, regardless of their quality dierence. Given any me, the residual demand for product i
is Di = 1  = 1 
pi
qi qe+m2
e. The marginal revenue implied by this demand function equals marginal cost
(which is zero) at Di = 1
2 regardless of the value of me. Of course, the equilibrium pi changes with me, and
so does the incumbent prots, but the equilibrium Di does not change.xii Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
This happens when qi  2qe. In this case, the entrant's product oers strictly positive utility.
The indierent consumer thus gets positive utility.
Subgame (I;TT). The entrant may be at the corner (me =
p
qe) or not (me >
p
qe). If
the entrant is at the corner, the incumbent's and entrant's products do not interact, so there
is no business stealing. In this case, the incumbent sets qi0 = qi and the outcome is the same
as in the (I;T) subgame.
If the entrant is not at the corner, then the incumbent has two options as to the quality of
its ghting product. It can either set qi > qi0 > qe or qe > qi0. The rst case is never optimal
because the competition in the low end ends up hurting prots for the high-quality product,
and so the incumbent will seek to maximize prots by setting qi0 = qi. In the second case,
there are two possibilities. First, the incumbent introduces a very low quality i0 which does
not aect the entrant's optimal amount of monetization intensity (as qe   m2
e > qi0, and
i0 obtains no demand). This case is equivalent to subgame (I;T). Second, the incumbent
introduces product i0 with quality close to qe. In this case, the entrant will set a smaller
monetization intensity to kill product i0 and the competitive pressure on product i will be
greater than if i0 had not been introduced.
In summary, the outcome of (I;TT) coincides with that of the (I;T) subgame.
APPENDIX C: PROOFS
Proof of Proposition A-1. Subgame (T;T): The derivation is straightforward by setting the
FOC of the prot function to zero and solve for the optimal pi and pe. pi =
(qe qi)qi
4qe qi and
pe =
2qe(qe qi)
4qe qi . The prots are 
(T;T)
i =
qiqe(qe qi)
(4qe qi)2 and 
(T;T)
e =
4q2
i (qi qe)
(4qi qe)2 .
Subgame (T;TT): We rst take FOCs of the prot functions and solve for the optimal pi,
pi0 and pe, assuming that qi0 is given. pi =
(qe qi)qi
4qe qi , pi0 =
(qe qi)qi0
4qe qi and pe =
2qe(qe qi)
4qe qi . The
prots are 
(T;TT)
i =
qiqe(qe qi)
(4qe qi)2 . Note that this prot is the same as in the (T;T) case and is
independent of qi0. Similarly, 
(T;T)
e =
4q2
i (qi qe)
(4qi qe)2 . Therefore, this case is weakly dominated by
(T;T).
Subgame (I;T): When qe   m2
e  qi, the incumbent is pushed out the market and 
(I;T)
e =
me. Hence the entrant will increase its monetization intensity as much as possible subject
to the constraint that qe   m2
e  qi. Hence, me =
p
qe   qi. Thus, 
(I;T)
i = 0 and 
(I;T)
e =

p
qe   qi. When qe   m2
e < qi, the FOC of 
(I;T)
i w.r.t. pi gives pi = 1
2(qi   qe + m2
e). The
FOC of 
(I;T)
e w.r.t. me is negative. Hence, the entrant will choose me as small as possiblexiii Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
subject to the constraint, qe   m2
e < qi. At the end of the process, the entrant essentially
kills the incumbent. Therefore, the entrant will set me to
p
qe   qi and the incumbent is
pushed out.
In summary, the prots are: 
(I;T)
i = 0 and 
(I;T)
e = 
p
qe   qi.
Subgame (I;M): When qe   m2
e  qi, the entrant pushes out the incumbent. Hence, the
optimal me =
p
qe   ql. We have 
(I;M)
i = 0 and 
(I;M)
e = 
p
qe   qi.
When qe  m2
e < qi, the FOC of 
(I;M)
e w.r.t. me is negative. Hence, similar to the (I;T)
case, the entrant will try to reduce me as much as possible. The incumbent responds by
lowering mi and pi. In the end, me =
p
qe   qi. The incumbent is again pushed out of the
market.
In summary, 
(I;M)
i = 0 and 
(I;M)
e = 
p
qe   qi.
Subgame (I;I): In this case, the Bertrand-style competition happens and the entrant pushes
out the incumbent by setting qe   m2
e = qi, and obtain the whole market. Hence, 
(I;I)
i = 0
and 
(I;I)
e = 
p
qe   qi.
Subgame (I;TT): When qe m2
e  qi > qi0, the incumbent is pushed out and the entrant has
a demand of 1. The maximum me the entrant can set is
p
qe   qi. The prots are 
(I;TT)
i = 0
and 
(I;TT)
e = 
p
qe   qi.
When qi > qe   m2
e  qi0, the incumbent's product i0 is pushed out. me is bounded by
p
qe   qi0. The FOC of 
(I;TT)
i w.r.t. pi gives pi = 1
2(qi  qe +m2
e). The FOC of 
(I;TT)
e w.r.t.
me is negative. Similar to the (I;T) case, product i will be pushed out as well. Hence, in
this case, the prots are the same as in the rst case.
When qi > qi0 > qe   m2
e, the FOC of 
(I;TT)
e w.r.t. me is negative so that the low-
quality product of the incumbent, i0, is pushed out and me =
p
qe   qi0. It is optimal for
the incumbent to set qi0 = 0 and pi0 = 0 as in this case, me will be set at the corner. Then
in equilibrium there is no interaction between the entrant and the incumbent's high-quality
product. The incumbent sets pi =
qi
2 and the entrant sets me =
p
qe. Each rm has half of
the market. Hence, 
(I;TT)
i =
qi
4 and 
(I;TT)
e = 1
2
p
qe.
The entrant decides whether to push the incumbent out of the market or co-exist with
it. Comparing the entrant's prots under both cases, we have: when qi < 3
4qe, the entrant
chooses to push out the incumbent, and 
(I;TT)
i = 0 and 
(I;TT)
e = 
p
qe   qi; otherwise, the
entrant chooses to co-exist with the incumbent, and 
(I;TT)
i =
qi
4 and 
(I;TT)
e = 1
2
p
qe.
Subgame (I;TI): The entrant product will get into Bertrand-type competition with thexiv Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
incumbent low-quality free product. In equilibrium, the incumbent is better o not having
the second product as the Bertrand competition eventually kills both incumbent's products.
Therefore, in this case me =
p
qe   qi. 
(I;TI)
e = 
p
qe   qi and 
(I;TI)
i = 0.
Proof of Proposition A-2. Subgame (T;T): The derivation is straightforward by setting the
FOC of the prot function to zero and solve for the optimal pi and pe. The prots are

(T;T)
i =
4q2
i (qi qe)
(4qi qe)2 and 
(T;T)
e =
qiqe(qi qe)
(4qi qe)2 .
Subgame (T;TT): We rst consider the rst case where qi > qi0 > qe. We rst take the
FOC of the two prot functions w.r.t. pi, pi0 and pe assuming that qi0 is given. We obtain
pi =
4qiqi0 qeqi 3qeqi0
8qi0 2qe , pi0 =
2qi0(qi0 qe)
4qi0 qe and pe =
qe(qi0 qe)
4qi0 qe . The incumbent prots are 
(T;TT)
i =
q2
e(qi qi0)+16qiq2
i0 8qeqi0(qi+qi0)
4(qi0 qe)2 . The FOC of 
(T;TT)
i w.r.t. qi0 is positive. Hence, it is optimal for
the incumbent to set qi0 = qi. Eectively, the incumbent will prefer to just oer one product
only. Hence, the optimal tactics are the same as in the (T;T) case. In this case, (T;TT) is
weakly dominated by (T;T).
Subgame (I;T): The FOC of the incumbent prot function w.r.t. pi gives the optimal price
pi = 1
2(qi  qe +m2
e): The FOC of the entrant prot function gives the optimal monetization
intensity of product e, me =
p
qi   qe. The constraint that qe   m2
e  0 gives me 
p
qe.
Therefore, when qi < 2qe, we have an interior solution. In this case, me =
p
qi   qe.
Substituting it to the expression of equilibrium pi, we have pi = qi qe. Hence, 
(I;T)
i =
qi qe
2
and 
(I;T)
e = 
2
p
qi   qe: When qi  2qe, we have a corner solution. In this case, me =
p
qe.
Thus, pi =
qi
2 , 
(I;T)
i =
qi
4 and 
(I;T)
e = 
2
p
qe.
Subgame (I;M): The FOC of 
(I;M)
i w.r.t. pi gives pi = 1
2(qi   qe   mi   m2
i + m2
e).
Substituting pi into the prot function, we have: 
(I;M)
i =
(qi qe+mi+(m2
e m2
i))2
4(qi qe+(m2
e m2
i)) : We can then
take FOC w.r.t. mi and obtain
m
2
i + qi   qe =
m3
i
mi   
: (A-1)
The FOC of the entrant prot function w.r.t. me gives:
me =
q
qi   qe   m2
i: (A-2)
We also need qe   m2
e  0, i.e., me <
p
qe. Hence, when qi  2qe,
p
qi   qe   m2
i 
p
qe
and we always have an interior solution. In this case, we could solve equations (A-1) andxv Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
(A-2) for mi and me, and obtain the expressions for equilibrium prots.
When qi > 2qe, we may have a corner solution: this happens when me computed from
equation (A-2) is greater than
p
qe. When we are at a corner, me =
p
qe and mi is solved by
equation (A-1).
Subgame (I;I): If qi m2
i < qe, the entrant will choose a small me such that qi m2
i < qe m2
e
and get all the demand. The best response for the incumbent is to decrease mi. Then the
entrant will decrease me. This process ends when qi   m2
i = qe.
Hence, the equilibrium monetization intensity for the incumbent is mi =
p
qi   qe. All
consumers purchase product i. Thus, 
(I;I)
i = 
p
qi   qe and 
(I;I)
e = 0.
Subgame (I;TT): When we are in the 2qe < qi case, we know from the (I;T) case that
the best outcome the incumbent can have is that the incumbent oers one product and the
entrant is at the corner. Hence, the incumbent does not want to oer product i0.
Now we look at the case where 2qe  qi. First consider qi0 > qe. We know that 2qe > qi0.
Hence, the entrant will be at the interior. From the (I;T) case, we know that me =
p
qi0   qe.
Now the FOCs of the prot function of the incumbent w.r.t. pi and pi0 give pi = ( qe +qi +
m2
e)=2 and pi0 = 1
2( qe + qi0 + m2
e). The prots of the incumbent are thus 1
4( qe + qi + m2
e),
which is independent of qi0. Hence, the incumbent will set qi0 such that me is as large as
possible. In equilibrium, qi0 = qi and we are back to the case (I;T).
We then consider the case where qi0  qe. If qi0 < qe   (
p
qi   qe)2, where
p
qi   qe is the
equilibrium amount of me without qi0. Then qi0 has no eect as i0 is killed by the entrant
and the equilibrium outcome is the same as in the (I;T) case.
Hence, the nal case we need to consider is when qe  qi0 > qe (
p
qi   qe)2. In this case,
if the equilibrium me is such that qe   m2
e > qi0, i.e., the entrant kills i0. The case is worse
than the (I;T) case because the entrant quality is forced to be higher.
Now we look at the case where qe   m2
e < qi0. The FOC of the entrant prot function,
(
pi0
qi0 (q e m2
e))me, w.r.t. me is negative. Hence, the entrant wants to lower its monetization
intensity as much as possible subject to qe   m2
e < qi0. Hence, me =
p
qi   qe. Essentially,
the entrant kills product i0. We know that the incumbent prefers not to have product i0 as
having it may force me to be smaller.
To summarize, the incumbent prefers not to oer product i0 and this case is dominated
by the (I;T) case.
Subgame (I;TI): We know that the two free products will compete as in the (I;I) case and
the incumbent will push the entrant out of the market. The incumbent maximizes 
(I;TI)
i byxvi Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
setting pi and mi0. The FOC w.r.t. pi gives: pi = 1
2mi0( + mi0): We then substitute pi into

(I;TI)
i and obtain:

(I;TI)
i =
( + mi0)2
4
: (A-3)
It is easy to see that 
(I;TI)
i increases in mi0. We conclude that the incumbent will set mi0 to
the maximum. Hence, mi0 =
p
qi   qe as the incumbent needs to make sure that the entrant
is pushed out. Therefore, the prots are 
(I;TI)
i =
2+(qi qe)+2
p
(qi qe)
4 and 
(I;TI)
e = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. We rst show that (I;I), (I;TI), (I;M), and (T;TT) cannot be
equilibrium business model combinations. According to Proposition A-1, we know that
(I;I), (I;TI) and (I;M) will never the equilibrium outcomes as the entrant will push the
incumbent out of the market in these cases. In addition, when the entrant chooses the
traditional business model, the only possible choices for the incumbent are T and TT and
TT is dominated by T in this case.
According to Proposition A-1, in the case of (T;T), both rms coexist. In the case of
(I;T), the entrant kills the incumbent. In the case of (I;TT), when qe=qi < 4=3, the entrant
chooses to co-exist with the incumbent; otherwise, the entrant chooses to push the incumbent
out and in this case, (I;T) weakly dominates (I;TT). Hence, only when the equilibrium
outcome is (I;T), the incumbent is pushed out of the market.
It is easy see that when  is large, the entrant prefers the new model to traditional
model. When the entrant prefers the new model model, the incumbent will be killed when
qe=qi is larger than 4=3 (regardless which business model the incumbent chooses). Hence,
the incumbent will stay put with T and the equilibrium outcome is (I;T). When the entrant
chooses the new model model and qe=qi is smaller than 4=3, the incumbent can survive only
by choosing TT. Hence, (I;TT) will be the equilibrium outcome.
Proof of Proposition 2. (I;I) and (I;TI) are never equilibrium outcomes as the entrant will
prefer T to avoid being pushed out of the market. According to Proposition A-2, (I;TT)
and (T;TT) do not occur in equilibrium because having a second, low-quality product makes
no dierence for the incumbent's prot.
Part (b) is straightforward. The incumbent cannot be pushed out as it has a higher
quality product and can always price its product close to zero and obtain positive demand.
At the same time, the entrant can always choose to compete through the traditional business
model and obtain some positive prot.xvii Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation
When qe=qi < 1=2, in the case of (I;M), the entrant will be at the corner and there will be
no strategic interaction between the entrant and the incumbent. We know as a monopolist,
the incumbent will prefer M to T. In addition, when  is not very large, the incumbent
will not want to choose TI or I as the competition between two free products will result in
cannibalization. The entrant will choose I only when  is large enough. Hence, (I;M) is the
outcome when  is suciently large and qe=qi is small. When qe=qi > 1=2, the incumbent
will prefer T to M as in this case, the entrant is not at the corner and with M, the net
quality levels of incumbent and the entrant will be closer.
Finally, when  is large, the incumbent will prefer I if it becomes aware of I and it will
push out the entrant. The entrant prefers not to reveal the innovation and enter with T.
And the best response of the incumbent is then T.
Proof of Proposition 3. Clearly, whenever the entrant adopts the traditional business model,
the competition is the same as in the case without innovation. As the entrant will only choose
to adopt the innovation if it can make more prots than competing with the traditional
model, in all regions where it adopts the innovation, its protability increases (note that we
assume that when the entrant is indierent from adopting and not adopting the innovation,
it will choose not to adopt the innovation).
The entrant is at the corner in regions (I;TT) of Figure 2a and (I;M) of Figure 2b.
Therefore, the incumbent makes more prots than what it would have earned if the entrant
adopts the traditional business model (as in this case the entrant would not be at the corner).
In region (I;T) of Figure 2b, the incumbent prots are
qi qe
2 with innovation and
4q2
i (qi qe)
(4qi qe)2
without innovation. It is easy to see that the former prots are greater than the latter.
Proof of Proposition 4. In the (I;M) region where qe < qi, the entrant is at the corner and
the incumbent acts as a monopolist. In this case, the incumbent prefers M to T. Hence, it
earns more prots as a result of the revelation of the innovation by the entrant.
In the case of (I;TT) where qe > qi, the entrant is at the corner and the incumbent earns
the monopoly prot.
The other two equilibrium outcomes are (T;T) and (I;T). In neither case, the entrant
will be at the corner and hence its existence decreases incumbent prots.